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PO Box 1050, Richland, WA 99352
USA
ABSTRACT
In May 2007, the Department of Energy and the Fluor Hanford K Basin Closure Project completed
transferring sludge from the K East Basin to new containers in the K West Basin using a Hose-in-Hose
system. This project presented a number of complex and unique technical, operational, and management
challenges that had to be resolved to complete the required transfers and satisfy project milestones. The
project team (including DOE; regulators; and Fluor management, operations, maintenance, engineering
and all other support organizations) found innovative solutions to each challenge.
This paper records lessons learned during the operational phase of the sludge transfer via the Hose-In-
Hose system. The subject is limited to the operational phase and does not cover design, development,
testing or turnover. A discussion ofthe situation or problem encountered is provided, along with the
lesson learned as applicable to a future program or project.
INTRODUCTION
The two K Basins at Hanford, Washington were placed into service in the 1950s as temporary holding
facilities for spent fuel from the K reactors. Each K Basin measures 38 meters (125 feet) by 20 meters
(67 feet) and holds 4 million liters (1.1 million gallons) ofwater. The two concrete basins sit less than
450 meters from the Columbia River and were originally unlined concrete structures with a design life of
20 years. The KEast (KE) andK West (KW) defense production reactors were shut down in 1971. [1]
Until 2004, the K Basins held the largest collection of spent nuclear fuel in the United States Department
of Energy (DOE) complex - over 1.8E6 TBq (50 million curies) of radioactivity. During the years of
fuel storage, water leaked from the KE Basin through a construction joint. This release of radioactive
material to the environment increased the urgency for removing the fuel, sludge, debris, and water from
the KE Basin so that it can be demolished and the soil under the facility can be rernediated,
In late 2004, Fluor completed the safe removal ofmore than 100,000 fuel elements. The 2, I00 metric
tons (4.6 million pounds) offuel were placed into dry storage far from the Columbia River. A significant
fraction of the fuel stored in the KE Basin degraded due to breaches of the cladding that occurred not
only from physical handling during reactor discharge, but also from corrosion during long-term storage
under water in open canisters. Over time, corrosion products from degrading fuel rods, storage racks,
concrete basin walls, organic material, and environmental particulates accumulated as sludge in the fuel
canisters and on the floor of the KE Basin (see Figure 1). Sludge in the K Basins is defined as material
smaller than 0.635-cm (0.25-inch) diameter.
Fluor began vacuuming sludge from the floor of the KE Basin in October 2004. The sludge retrieval
process used submersible pumps to vacuum the sludge into newly constructed steel containers that were
submerged in the basin. To retrieve the sludge, operators manipulated specially designed vacuum heads
at the end of long pole tools as they stood on grating suspended above the basin water. The pumping
system included a strainer to ensure material larger than 0.635 cm (0.25-inch) did not reach the sludge
containers.
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Fig. 1. Hanford 's K East Basin had badly corroded fuel (left) aud sludge (right).
After the sludge in the ICE Basin was collected in the engineered containers, it was pumped to new
containers submerged in the KW Basin via a Hose-In-Hose (HIH) system. The sludge transfer began in
October 2006, and all sludge was transferred in May 2007. Sludge in the KW basin has also been
vacuumed into new containers where it will be stored pendin g treatment and disposal.
HOSE-IN·HOSE SLUDGE TRANSFER SYSTEM
The HIH system retrieved the sludge from containers in the ICE Basin , injected dilution water as
necessary to control slurry concentration, and pumped the slurry to containers in the KW Basin. The
simplified sketch in Figure 2 depicts the system . The four outdoor primary booster pumps (P-301, P-302,
P-303, and P-304) were enclosed in containment structures (booster pump stations). Each of the stations
also included an installed spare pump that could be used in the event that the primary pump in that stat ion
failed . The sludge transfer hose installed above water was a hose-inside-hose configuration: the inner or
transfer hose was 3.175 em (1.25- inch) diameter, cootained ioside a 10.16 cm (4-incb) diameter outer
hose.
Booster Stadons
N55
....
'----{- 'l----'
KE Basin KW Basin
Fig.2. This schematic is a simple illustration of the Hill Sludge Transfer System.
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The concentration of the solids in the slurry was controlled by adjusting dilution water based on feedback
from an in-line suspended solids instrument.
HIH OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
There is only one thing more painful than learning from experience, and that is not learning from
experience. -Laurence J. Peter
Operation of the Hill system provided a wealth of experience and lessons learned. A summary of some
of the more significant operational lessons are provided in the remainder of this paper. [2]
Bottom Suction Retrieval, Dilution Strategy, and Sparging
Retrieval ofsludge from the KE containers was completed via suction from the bottom outlet ofthe
container. The solids feed rate was not constant and depended on theformation ofthe sludge inside the
tank and the effectiveness oftank sparging. Mobilization ofthe sludge was crucial to getting the sludge
out ofthe containers.
The HlH design injected dilution water via a pipe with its discharge located a few centimeters above the
outlet at the bottom of the container. Additional dilution water Wasadded downstream from the container
based on feedback from instrumentation measuring suspended solids to maintain a nominal slurry
concentration of approximately two percent by volume. The operational concept was to allow the system
to operate in automatic mode until the sludge near the tank discharge was removed and indicated solids
concentrations were low. Then, mechanical action and/or sparging (water spray) would hegin to fluidize
sludge from the back of the container and move it toward the tank outlet
Figure 3 shows views of a typical KE sludge container. Support structures and other equipment (e.g.,
sludge distributor, level monitor probes) inside the container obstructed spargingactivities that used water
lances inserted through a hole in the basin grating, down through the slotted hole in the tank covers. One
sparge lance was used for each of the six openings. Three tanks were smaller as shown in Figure 3; a
fourth tank was much larger. The fourth tank had 16 holes provided for sparge lances.
Once the bulk of sludge was removed from a container using the sparge lances, high pressure water lances
were installed in the container to wash the remaining sludge to the outlet. In testing, this process worked
well.
In actual operation the bottom retrieval method was challenged by factors not considered in design and
testing. First, a field modification during construction resulted in a condition where the mtemal dilution
pipe did not extend low enough to properly dilute the sludge at the container discharge. This situation
was not discovered for several days after sludge retrieval began. Once the dilution lance was lowered to
the intended location, tbe ability to agitate, dilute, and mobilize the sludge in the container was greatly
improved.
Second, additional piping was added after testing had completed. Hoses, pipe elbows, and a three-way
valve were added on the discharge ofeach pair of containers to simplify switching between containers.
Adding this additional head loss on the suction side of the first slurry pump made it more difficult to
retrieve sludge from the container.
Third, foreign material/debris items that were inadvertently dropped into the sludge container hampered
the sparging efforts at the end of tank transfers. Also, the gentle slopes ofthe bottom ofthe containers
made mobilization of sludge to the container outlet difficult.
3
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Fig. 3.
Finally, high-pressure washers using small orifice spray tips often became clogged or plugged, most
likely due to actions to physically move sludge with the lance when the water was not flowing, or
pressing the tip into the sludge to break up mounds.
LessQns
Mobilizing the sludge inside the tank is crucia l to obtaining good flow out of the discharge. A pennanent
dilution source should be integra l to the container to ensure that the dilution water will be added at the
cr itical location to mobilize sludge. Physical agitat ion should be considered instead ofwater spray.
Container bottoms should slope at a steep angle toward a bottom discharge, consistent with the angle of
repose for the sludge materials.
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Internal structural elements should be kept to a bare minimum (possibly design to remove a distributor
after the tank is fined) . These items make it difficult to use tools that can reach the sludge. Irregular
shapes also allow sludge to collect in areas that are difficult to reach and clean.
Engineered and administrative controls to prevent foreign material from entering the containers during all
stages of construction and operations are essential.
Ifwater sparging is to be used, the water source should be a separate source from the water used to dilute
the slurry. The HIH design that shared the source water proved to be inefficient and created a number of
operational problems. The act of diluting the slurry stream needs to be completely decoupled from the
methods necessary to move sludge to the discharge of the tank.
F oreign Material in Sludge Contain er s
Unexp ected foreign materials in the sludge containers in KE proved to bea significant challenge. Design
requirements and the design/testing did not address this potential. Coarse stra iners and basket strainers
added to the HIH system to address foreign material created additional challenges for system operation.
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To fill the KE sludge containers, the sludge was pumped through safety-significant strainer baskets to
prevent fuel pieces larger than O.635-cm (O.25-inch) from reaching the containers. However, during the
installation of the containers, and during transition between filling the containers and preparing them for
emptying, the containers did not have covers. Either during construction or later when installed covers
were removed, foreign material was introduced to the containers. Foreign material included nuts, writing
pens, plastic, rags, tape rolls, lights and cords. The smaller foreign material created pump obstructions
and larger material blocked sludge from the outlet of the tanks.
Flushing and removing these items caused delays in processing and drove the addition of coars e strainers
at the container outlets to prevent damaging the transfer pumps. The addition of coarse strainers (Figure
4) caused additional operational issues due to pressure drops and plugging.
A variety of flushing methods were employed depending on the specific problem encountered. Back
flushing was not designed into the system. Some flushing required the preparation of work packages and
the reconfiguration of the hoses/pumps, while others required valve sequences that were incorporated in
the operating procedures. In all cases, stopping the sludge transfer to perform a flush was time
consuming and had a significant effect on the efficiency of the HIH system.
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Fig. 4. This diagram shows the configuration of the Hill system before and after an in-line coarse strainer
was added.
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Although the process of filling the containers restricted fuel pieces (and therefore debris items) larger than
0.635-cm (0.25-inch), foreign debris material was not positively excluded by engineered barriers at the
top ofthe containers. Design specifications should account for foreign material in the sludge.
Administrative procedures were developed during the HIH operations to prohibit additional foreign
material from getting into the containers when the covers and settler tubes were removed, but these
administrative methods were not fully effective in preventing foreign material from entering the system.
The original design should incorporate back-flushing capabilities. During HIH, back-flush operations
were possible only through creativity and hard work, swapping underwater hoses. A great deal oftime
could have been saved if design and operations had accounted for back-flushing.
Suspended Solids Metering
Accuracy ofthe suspended solids meter in the HIH system was problematic for tracking the volume of
sludge transferred.
The Hll:Itransfer system retrieved sludge from the KE storage containers by diluting the sludge slurry to
a set percentage of solids for delivery to the transfer pumps, Maintaining solids content within specified
limits was essential to achieving the design sludge transfer rate, protecting the system from too high a
sludge concentration, and maintaining assumptions of the approved safety analyses. Once the transfer of
sludge began, the basin water became too cloudy to observe sludge levels in the tanks. Without visual
evidence of sludge levels, the suspended solids meter was used to estimate changing sludge volumes in
the supply container and receipt container. During operation of theHIH system, the solids measurement
instruments were also used to provide feedback to operators who were using water lances to mobilize
sludge in the KE sludge supply tanks. In addition, wear rates of the transfer pwnps were monitored based
on volume of slurry transferred through the pumps.
The Hili suspended solids meter consistently provided an output higher than the actual solids contained
in the slurry. This error was revealed after comparing observed volumes collected in the receiving
containers with the volume calculated as transferred using the solids instrument readings. The magnitude
of the error appeared to vary considerably depending on operating conditions ofthe transfer system. The
ratio of the indicated to the actual solids concentration ranged from four to ten throughout the transfer
campaign. The error was observed to be smaller when the feed of solids from the source container was
consistent and the inlet pressure on the first transfer pump was stable, and larger under changing
conditions, especially when plugging of the container outlet was suspected.
One ofthe most likely contributors to the error was gas bubbles in the slurry stream. Gas bubbles could
be seen as false solids by tbe ultrasonic attenuation detector. Bubbles could have originated in the
dilution water or as a result of cavitation during pressure/vacuum oscillations.
To help confirm solids transfer, a portable radiation detector was placed adjacent to the slurry line.
Adding this instrumentation provided useful feedback to operators in assessing whether or not the slurry
contained sludge or the suspended solids meter was reading falsely due to suspect conditions described
above. The radiation instrument provided only a gross indication, but was still beneficial in assessing the
system's performance.
Lessons
An ultrasonic instrument to measure solids should not be located where it is subject to oscillations of
pressure/vacuum. Placing the jnstrument at the discharge ofthe first transfer pump rather thanat the
suction, could possibly have eliminated a large portion of the error observed.
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When using an ultrasonic or optical instrument, preclude sources of air entrainment in the slurry stream
that could cause false readings.
A radiation monitor that measures slurry radioactivity provides useful feedback of the system's
performance, and should be included in the design.
Using two types of solids instruments (e.g, ultrasonic and mass flow) should be considered. Neither
instrument on its own provides complete information (solids concentration and density) needed to
eliminate having to make assumptions regarding properties of the waste being transferred. Use ofboth
indications could provide better information for assessing system performance and determining the
volume transferred.
Estimates of the duration required to transfer the KE sludge were based on the expected suspended solids
in the slurry. Actual transfer rates were significantly less than those assumed during design. Analyzed
accident consequences and resulting controls were developed using assumed solids content in the slurry,
and appeared to be overly conservative. Future projects should consider the potential for errors in process
data and evaluate the sensitivity of those errors on the operational timelines and accident analyses.
Pump Wear Failures and Monitoring
Erosive wear ofthe pump casings was identified as a critical issue in the design ofthe HIH booster
station pumps. Monitoring pump wear using ultrasonic sensors fixed to the pump casing was effective.
However, locating sensors in expected areas ofhighest wear is a challenge.
Testing during the development phase of the Hlli project evaluated pump wear. Due to the high level of
radioactivity and the wide variability in the sludge's characteristics, conservative test simulants were used.
Testing was performed to establish an expected operational wear rate based on scaled-down test pump
casing wear. A monitoring program was established with safety limits for allowable booster pump wear.
Ultrasonic thickness (UT) sensors were placed on each outdoor booster station pump with the location of
the sensors based on the highest areas of wear experienced during testing.
During the transfer campaign, there were two wear-related failures of a submersible transfer pump.
Evaluation of the submersible pumps' design, combined with a reevaluation oftest data taken early in the
project, identified a potential failure mechanism associated with localized wear that occurs in the vicinity
of an internal casing weld (Figure 5). The pumps include a "cavity" located just behind the edge of the
impeller intended to adjust the pump performance characteristics. It was noticed in the test pumps that
the highest wear area was located at the corner of the cavity, where it met the casing wall. In the case of
the failed pumps, this location coincided with the weldjoining the casing wall to the casing upper flange.
It was surmised that the high wear area eroded the weld (not a full penetration weld) and ultimately
resulted in the holes found in the pumps. Similar high wear locations in the test pump were not
coincident with the location of the weld and therefore did not result in similar failures during wear testing.
The welding process itselfis another potential contnbutor to the localized failures in the region of the
welds. The Hlli pumps were made of duplex stainless steel to resist erosion. The properties of duplex
stainless steels can be appreciably affected by welding. Due to the importance ofmaintaining a balanced
microstructure and avoiding the formation ofundesirable metallurgical phases, the welding procedures
must be properly specified and controlled. If the welding procedure is improper and disrupts the
appropriate microstructure, loss ofmaterial properties can occur. The possibility ofreduced wear
resistance due to changes in the material caused by welding may have contributed to the Hili pump
failures.
The failures of the submersible pump prompted further inspection of the above-water booster station
pumps. A manual scan of the casings of the booster station pumps identified wear that was higher than
that being recorded by the nine original UT sensors. The high wear was located at the edge of the
7
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"cavity" in those pumps as well. The casing weld was not coincident with the high wear area in the
booster station pnmps, so there was no immediate concern with a similar wear failure. Additional sensors
were placed at the higher wear locations and those sensors were added to the wear monitoring program.
Impeller
Fig. 5. This diagram indicates the location of the failure of the underwater pumps.
Lessons
It is clear from testing and operations that the constituents of the K Basin sludge cause significant wear in
centrifugal pumps. However, the pump wear is highly localized and it is difficult to predict the exact
location ofthe highest wear without testing a full-scale pump. In the case of the booster station pumps,
the locations predicted from the scale model testing were not the highest wear locations in the full-scale
pumps. The reason for this discrepancy is surmised to be due to the existence of the cavity behind the
impeller in the booster station pumps.
The use offixed (epoxy-mounted) UT sensors on a stainless steel wall provided reliable thickness
readings that could be obtained remotely, away from the high-dose areas near the pumps. Tn the illH
application, it would have been impractical to make periodic hand-held readings because the pumps were
shrouded with a thick steel shield.
Some problems were encountered in getting the epoxy to set when the work Was being performed in the
field (outdoors in cold weather). Temperature control and cleanliness is important when applying the
epoxy to attach the U1' sensors. If the work can be done in a controlled environment before installation,
the sensors remained well attached throughout the mission.
FUll-penetration welding in areas ofwear should be required when procuring pumps. Weld materials
should be chosen to provide equivalent resistance to the wear as the base metal.
The properties of duplex stainless steels can be appreciably affected by welding. Welding procedures
must be properly specified and controlled. Ifthe welding procedure is improper, loss of material
properties such as wear resistance can occur.
Booster Station Pump Seals
Booster station pumps utilized a double mechanical seal with a pressurized barrier fluid to reduce the
possibility ofseal failures in the outdoor booster stations. These seal technologies brought unique
challenges with respect to maintainingfluid levels and pressure in the sea/reservoir during operatton.
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HJH booster station pumps were conventional ASME B73.1 horizontal, single-stage, end-suction pumps
with custom features. This style ofpump relies Ona mechanical seal to prevent leakage ofprocess fluid
through the shaft penetration. For the Hrn: transfer system, the highly abrasive sludge ruled out using a
canned motor pump and other considerations prevented selecting positive displacement pumps without
mechanical seals.
A highly reliable sealing system was needed for the 1·llHbooster pumps due to the significant radiological
impact of a seal failure. An American Petroleum Institute (API) Plan 53A double mechanical seal system
was selected for the HJHbooster pumps because this type ofmechanical seal configuration is normally
considered to provide the highest protection against entry ofprocess fluid into the seal chamber. The API
Plan 53A system utilizes a pressurized external fluid reservoir so that flow across the seal face is always
from the barrier fluid to the process fluid. Due to the abrasiveness of the sludge, tungsten carbide seal
faces were used on the in-board (process) side and a tungsten carbide to carbon face was deployed au the
outboard (atmosphere) side.
The initial design of the HJH system did not provide a permanently mounted compressed gas recharge
system for the seal fluid reservoirs. Instead, a portable, manual means ofrecharging each tank was
required. It would typically take [rom 30 to 45 minutes to recharge the reservoir. During operations, loss
ofpressure in the reservoir tank was a frequent event and the additional labor and the lost transfer time
resulting from the manual charging method became a significant inefficiency. Midway through the HJH
sludge transfer, a permanent compressed gas recharge system was installed at each booster station.
Low seal fluid level alarms were received multiple times during the sludge transfer campaign due to leaks
into the process system. Generally, this would occur after the pumps were shut down, but did
occasionally occur during operation, resulting in a system trip. The recovery required manually refilling
the reservoir during system shutdown, and using high-pressure air to "shock' the seal faces into properly
reseating.
Ensuring the mechanical seals would operate within recommended limits also required installing alarms
and interlocks to shut down the system. Many HIH system shutdowns were due to seal protection
interlock actuations On high or low pressure. The SOUTces of the pressure excursions were mainly
attributed to causes away from the booster station pumps, such as the line being blocked, the failure of a
submersible pump, or high pump vibration.
Lessons
The API Plan 53A double mechanical seal with an externally pressurized barrier fluid system proved
highly reliable and should be considered on future projects where centrifugal pumps with mechanical
seals are selected, and failures of the seals have significant radiological concerns. If used, seal systems
should be designed for frequent fluid replenishment and adjustable pressurization.
The downside of the seal protection strategy was the high level of engineering required, the relatively
high maintenance of the seal support system, and the many system trips that were directly attributable to
seal protection.
Use of a data logger to track process variables is highly recommended when pump seal protection
interlocks are employed. The Hili data logger proved invaluable during troubleshooting in identifying
which interlock tripped, and in determining the cause ofthe trip.
Pumps that do not use mechanical seals, such as canned motor pumps and certain positive displacement
pumps should be considered when the application allows. Mechanical seals are often a weak link in
pumping systems, particularly undesirable for non-submersible pumps in radioactive waste pumping
applications. Elimination of seal support systems can save significant engineering, construction, and
maintenance resources, especially when multiple pumps are used.
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During early HIH testing. high vibration was observed in the table-mountedpumps and motors. The
mountings were modified as the system was constructed to reduce the potential for vibration. During
operations, vibration levels increased and vibration monitoring became necessary to ensure satisfactory
operation.
The Hili booster station pumps were placed inside of a steel enclosure to mitigate the release of
radioactive material to the environment in the event of a leak. The design removed the pump/motor from
the manufacturer's base mounting and placed the pump motor outside of the enclosure with a flexible
coupling to the pump shaft. This configuration is a non-standard pump mounting configuration driven by
the unusual requirements for containment.
A single booster pump station was tested at the fabricator's facility before the pump was delivered. The
results of that testing showed that horizontal vibrations were in excess of the Hydraulic Institute Standard.
A series of design modifications were made to reduce vibration and improve the pump/motor mountings.
After the booster stations were installed, additional testing showed decreased horizontal vibrations but
also showed increased axial vibrations in excess ofthe Hydraulics Institute standard. These results drove
additional field modifications of the pump/motor mounting in the field.
Midway through the HilI transfer operations, high vibration was observed in one of the booster stations.
In response, vibration sensors were permanently fixed to the three axes on each of the booster station
pumps and a monitoring program was implemented. The monitoring program defined thresholds for
pump operation and monitoring frequency to ensure that vibration levels did not increase over time
without being detected. The main concerns with excessive vibration levels were the integrity of the pump
seal and piping or structural failures.
In some instances during operation, vibration levels would increase marginally and hourly surveillance
was performed. In this case, slurry transfer was allowed to continue. In other cases, vibration levels
increased to levels that required the system to be stopped. Typical responses included checking
equipment, tightening mounting supports, or changing operating speeds to reduce the vibration.
The root cause of the vibration issues on the booster pump stations was associated with the mounting of
the pumps and motors. In addition, buildup ofparticulate on the vanes of the pump's impeller (see
discussion of pump fouling) clearly contributed to increased vibration during operation. Modal analysis
of the booster station structure, including the purnp stands, showed resonance frequencies near the
rotational frequency of the pumps at operating speeds. Typically, pumps and their motors are mounted to
a monolithic base (usually a concrete slab) to eliminate external resonance effects.
Lessons
Future projects should pay attention to the mounting configuration of all rotating equipment during the
design phase. In the case of theHm: booster pumps, a monolithic base of thick steel that would span
across the station wall and hold both pump and the stiffening of the table supports would have been a
better option for the pumps/motors.
Future projects using centrifugal pumps to transfer radioactive waste should install vibration sensors on
the pump assembly to allow for remote monitoring.
Fouling of Booster Station Pump
HIH-P-302 exhibited high vibration, and ultimately. was found to have one impeller cavityfully blocked
by sludge buildup. Determination ofthe causes and recovery were time consuming. Analysis indicated a
potential design flaw in the impeller.
/0
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During HIH transfer operations in January 2007, personnel observed significant increases in vibration
from three ofthe four booster pumps. The vibration at one pump was so severe the transfer was shut
down to prevent the pump from failing. At that time, transfer of leE sludge was less than 20 percent
eomplete. Although each Hili booster station contained an installed spare pump, the onset of
unacceptably high vibration that early in the transfer process caused legitimate concern. No spare booster
pumps were Onhand and the long lead time associated with procuring new pumps brought significant risk
that the HIH project would not be completed on schedule.
Several days prior to the pump shutdown, a five percent reduction in the pump head was noted. At the
time ofpump shutdown, the booster pumps were not equipped with vibration sensors. Vibration sensors
were installed and the pump was operated in an unsuccessful attempt to flush out any debris. Analysis of
the vibration data concluded that the resonance was originating from the pump's impeller, possibly due to
the impeller's mounting being loose or fouling by foreign objects. Based on this conclusion, an effort
was initiated to inspect the pump internals using a baroscope.
The boroscope inspection revealed accumulations ofprocess sludge within the pump's closed impeller.
Inspection through the discharge ofthe pump showed the trailing edges of all five vanes had a mixed
composition ofsolid particles packed tightly along their trailing edge. Inspection through the inlet eye of
the pump revealed a buildup of solids in one of the five impeller passageways (Figure 6). This passage
was fully bridged with sludge and is the likely cause of the severe vibration experienced on this pump.
The pump impeller design quickly became the focus of investigation.
The manufaeturer's drawings submitted as part ofthe pump procurement did not show the details of
impeller construction. A review of the drawings, once obtained, identified the impeller's very narrow,
only 0.635 em (0.25-inch) wide, and highly wrapped (approximately 240") vanes, as Canbe seen in Figure
6. The narrow closed vanes were a surprise to the project engineers, as particles up to 0.635 em (0.25-
inch) were known to be in the sludge.
The impeller rotates counter-elockwise as viewed looking at the pump inlet The long, highly wrapped
vanes of the pump are believed to allow heavy particles to "stick" along the underside surface ofthe vane,
where the tangent to the vane surface is close to 90 degrees from a radial line. The radial forces
generated at that location tend to compact the sludge, while the flow velocity adjacent to this surface is
low. These combined effects can lead to the accumulation of sludge along the underside ofthe vane.
To help confirm the theory, an independent computational fluid dynamic (CPD) analysis of the impeller
wasperformed. The CFD analysis confirmed a flow recirculation pattern on the trailing face of the vane
in the location as where the solids accumulations in the fouled pump were observed.
The CFD analysis was not able to definitively predict if sludge accumulation and growth would occur, but
the recirculation along the vane can be interpreted as favorable for its occurrence. The conclusion was the
impeller passage plugging stemmed more from inadequate clearance through the impeller (i.e., allowing
objects 0.635 em or larger into the pump) than the internal recirculation patterns along the vanes.
This conclusion appears to have been borne out by completion of the Hili transfer without recurrence of
severe vibration attributable to fouling after installation ofupstream 0.476 em (3/16 inch) strainers in the
system.
Lessons
The procurement specification had unrealistic requirements for hydraulic performance for a centrifugal
slurry pump. The project required that thepump be a relatively small end-suction (single-stage) pump, in
accordance with ASME B73.1, and that it produce a very high head (- 200 m [700 ft] ofhead) while
pumping slurry. No other slurry pump manufacturer was found that could generate more than half of that
pump head with a centrifugal pump. Only one pump vendor made an offering in response to the request
for proposal, which should also have raised suspicion about the specification requirements.
---_.._--._-------
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Procurements of pumps for transferring sludge should require the manufacturer to disclose the details of
the internal dimensions. The impeller for the HIH booster station pump was designed with 0.635-cm
(O.2S-inch) wide closed vane passages, yet the HIH slurry could contain material up to 0.635.cm (0.25-
inch) diameter. The pump vendor did not provide the internal dimensions of the pump until after fouling
was suspected. The vendor data sheets stated that 0.635-cm (0.25·inch) particulate could be transferred
by the pumps . Most slurry pump manufacturers use a 1.5:1 or 2:1 margin between the largest sphere that
can be passed through the pump and the width of the impeller vanes .
F,
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Fig. 6. The diagram on th e left is a sketch of th e HlH impeller with radial and tangential forces.
The photograph on the right shows th e underside of a fouled pump vane (top) and bridged van e
passage viewed from pump inlet (bottom).
Pumps with highly wrapped impeller vanes should not be selected for slurry applications because of the
potential for collect ing material on the vanes .
Designs for system pumping slurry should combine pump internal clearances with slurry particle size
contro l to prevent fouling. After strainers were installed, the HIll transfer was completed without
recurrence of severe vibration attrihutable to fouling.
The presence of an installed secondary booster pump in each Booster Station proved invaluab le to
completing the transfer. At HIH trans fer completion, all four secondary booster pumps were in operation.
Future proj ects should consider a trip condition that wou ld transition the system to a flush mode and
possib ly a speed reduction instead of a full stop so that slurry bu ildup is reduced or eliminated whenever
possib le. Majo r vibration indications induced by materia l deposition on the impeller vanes, seemed to
occur immediately after HIH system trip conditions, stopp ing the pump with slurry in the lines and pumps.
Data A cq u isition during Operations
The inclusion ofa data logger to monitor and record operational parameters proved to be an invaluable
toolf or diagnosis ofproblems.
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The project utilized a data acquisition unit. or data logger. to display and record several HIlI system
variables. This unit was instrumental in the success ofthe project. It was used for routine operations as
well as diagnosis ofproblems during start-up and system trips during sludge transfer operations. With
seven centrifugal pumps operating in series. it can be impossible to determine the cause of transients or
the source of system trips in real time. Only through review of data traces obtained from the data logger
were HlH system engineers able to troubleshoot the system effectively.
The flexibility of the data logger to display and record data was a major factor in its selection and use.
The following features ofthe data logger were very useful during this project;
o Input channels: Of the 30 analog input channels. all but four were used.
o Math channels: The unit had another 30 math channels available. Math channels take signals
from one or more of the input channels and perform a user selected mathematical function. All
but three of these channels were used.
o Multiple user configurable screens: The user has a choice ofhow to display the data being
monitored and recorded. The digital and trend were the two most useful screens for the HlH
project.
o Data card: The data logger stored recorded data in a memory buffer. The data was transferred to
a removable memory card periodically. This feature was essential in getting the data from the
data logger transferred to a desktop computer for review and analysis.
o Support software: The HIH project had support software to display and analyze the recorded data
using a personal computer. This aspect of the data logger system was very useful for trouble
shooting. tuning. and analyses of the HlH system.
o Sampling/recording intervals: Complicated and sensitive hydraulic system data recording at a
relatively rapid (1 second) rate allowed for data analysis and troubleshooting that may have been
impossible if larger sampling/recording intervals were used.
Lessons
A data logger is essential for troubleshooting transients in a moderately complex process system.
Allow for expansion. Including 10-20 percent extra channels is recommended. Early in the design
process. the decision was made to double the number of channels available on the HIH data logger. This
proved to be wise choice as more signals were connected to the data logger as the design process
continued.
Lock and Tag
Consideration ofLockandTagboundaries andlocations during thedesign maysavesignificant time
during system operation andmaintenance.
The HIH system operated within and between the two K Basins spaced greater than 400 meters (Y. mile)
apart. Many of the COmponents within the HlH system had multiple power supplies located in different
facilities. The process ofhanging Lock and Tag for maintenance in different facilities which were posted
as airborne radiation areas required substantial time and planning.
Lessons
When designing a system, incorporate provisions for lock and tag. Some items ofnote are:
• "Plug-in" items that can be under the exclusive control of the worker should be used wherever
possible.
o Multiple power sources within a panel should be avoided if possible.
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• The placement of electrical power supplies outside of airborne radiation and contamination areas
is desirable. The expense of additional conduit will be offset by the time saved performing
maintenance and hazardous energy isolation.
• Isolation valves should be provided on the suction and discharge of every pump.
• Isolation valves should be provided for every gauge.
• If isolation valves ate anticipated to be throttled during operation, an additional isolation valve
should be installed in series.
CONCLUSION
Design estimates of the duration anticipated to transfer all sludge out ofKE Basin were on the order of40
hOUTS. Ultimately, the operation took seven months. The difference between these durations reflects the
level of difficulty encountered in completing the HllI project. Valuable lessons were learned, as
discussed in this paper, which may help future projects that undertake similar campaigns.
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